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Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement stand as milestone diplo-
matic achievements. However, immense discrepancies between political commit-
ments and governmental action remain. Combined national climate commitments
fall far short of the Paris Agreement’s 1.5/2C targets. Similar political ambition
gaps persist across various areas of sustainable development. Many therefore argue
that actions by nonstate actors, such as businesses and investors, cities and regions,
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are crucial. These voices have reso-
nated across the United Nations (UN) system, leading to growing recognition,
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promotion, and mobilization of such actions in ever greater numbers. This article
investigates optimistic arguments about nonstate engagement, namely: (a) “the
more the better”; (b) “everybody wins”; (c) “everyone does their part”; and
(d) “more brings more.” However, these optimistic arguments may not be matched
in practice due to governance risks. The current emphasis on quantifiable impacts
may lead to the under-appreciation of variegated social, economic, and environ-
mental impacts. Claims that everybody stands to benefit may easily be contradicted
by outcomes that are not in line with priorities and needs in developing countries.
Despite the seeming depoliticization of the role of nonstate actors in implementa-
tion, actions may still lead to politically contentious outcomes. Finally, nonstate cli-
mate and sustainability actions may not be self-reinforcing but may heavily depend
on supporting mechanisms. The article concludes with governance risk-reduction
strategies that can be combined to maximize nonstate potential in sustainable and
climate-resilient transformations.
This article is categorized under:
Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change
Governance
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Both the Paris Agreement on climate change and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) converge on the idea that
nonstate actors such as businesses, investors, cities, regions, and NGOs1 can and do deliver on agreed goals. Prominent figures
like former U.S. President Barack Obama and former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Christiana Figueres argued that nonstate actors have already spurred low-carbon and sustainable
transformations, calling for their acceleration (Figueres et al., 2017; Obama, 2017). Both the UN and the UNFCCC recognize
these actions and set up platforms registering voluntary nonstate commitments and partnerships, such as “Partnerships for
SDGs” and the “Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Actions” (NAZCA).
Combined national climate commitments fall far short of the Paris Agreement's 1.5/2C targets (Rogelj et al., 2016). Simi-
lar gaps persist across sustainable development areas. Such gaps between government interventions, outcomes, and interna-
tional targets have sparked varying perspectives in scholarship about nonstate actions' contribution. Some doubt their
effectiveness (e.g., Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2017) or stress their dependency on state-based forms of governance
(e.g., Bulkeley et al., 2012; Hickmann, 2017), yet others assert that nonstate actions will contribute to complexity, fragmenta-
tion, and possibly undermine governance legitimacy and accountability (Kuyper, Linnér, & Schroeder, 2017). A growing
number of studies, however, take an optimistic, if cautious, view that nonstate action could bridge governance gaps
(e.g., Graichen et al., 2016; Hsu, Cheng, Weinfurter, Xu, & Yick, 2016; Hsu, Moffat, Weinfurter, & Schwartz, 2015; Roelfsema,
Harmsen, Olivier, Hof, & Van Vuuren, 2018; Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017). While there has been growing optimism, and empha-
sis on potential and positive signals, few studies look at whether, and under which circumstances, optimistic expectations can be
realized.
This opinion2 reflects on the growing optimism in policy making and in scholarship about the role of nonstate actors in
sustainable and climate-resilient3 transformations.
Positive arguments for nonstate actions were identified through exploratory readings of policy communications, opinion
pieces, and research publications. Following extensive dialogues and teleconferences, stylized arguments were clustered.4 These
arguments are not necessarily attributable to one or a few sources but characterize sets of similar reasons in support of nonstate
engagement. As the range of possible arguments is indeterminable, and identified arguments may overlap or be combined into
many variations, we do not rule out other stylized arguments, nor do we claim comprehensiveness. Multiperspectivity and interdis-
ciplinarity inform our discussion within a uniquely diverse group of scholars and practitioners from developing and developed
countries.5
We formulate four stylized arguments as follows: (a) “the more the better”; (b) “everybody wins”; (c) “everybody does
their part”; and (d) “more will bring more.” We reflect on what it takes to realize positive outcomes of nonstate engagement
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by identifying governance risks and discussing opportunities to mitigate them. Given the great diversity among nonstate
actors, the following discussion also illustrate which types of actors are likely to relate to the respective arguments.
2 | THE PROMISE OF NONSTATE ACTIONS
Optimistic arguments about nonstate action are neither mutually exclusive nor expressive of single ideas. Rooted in multiple
rationales, they imply causal relationships between nonstate engagement and positive governance outcomes. However, gover-
nance risks may hinder such outcomes.
2.1 | The more the better
The “Partnerships for the SDGs” and NAZCA platforms visualize large numbers of nonstate actions. Nonstate actions' catalytic
effect aside (see Section 2.4), their increasing numbers is cause for considerable optimism. “The more the better” denotes the view
that large numbers of sustainability and climate actions are desirable. The rationale is that nonstate actors have the clout to enable
change irrespective of what national governments do. For example, the “America's Pledge” report highlights United States-based
efforts, stressing that “[d]espite federal efforts to roll back policies and programs, climate action is robust and accelerating across an
increasing swath of America” (Bloomberg Philanthropies, 2017, p. 9). But are high numbers a reliable indication of progress?
In aggregate, more nonstate action can help close gaps in governance. In the climate realm, such action, particularly by
multistakeholder partnerships (or cooperative initiatives), businesses, and subnational authorities, can address mitigation gaps
left by insufficient government commitments (e.g., UNEP, 2017, 2018). However, different aggregation methodologies result
in divergent estimates (e.g., Hsu et al., 2018; UNEP, 2016). Moreover, double counting may occur when, for instance, both
cooperative initiatives' outcomes and individual participants' actions are counted. Similarly, double or triple counting of
national, regional, and local government actions may occur (Widerberg & Pattberg, 2015). One governance risk is that
national governments may rely on overestimated impacts, basing policies on inaccurate assessments and concluding errone-
ously that national targets have been met (Hermwille, 2018).
Another risk is to overemphasize actors with “high mitigation potential”—for instance, businesses in the energy sector—
while underappreciating actors such as knowledge institutions or community-level organizations whose contributions are less
easily quantifiable. Knowledge sharing, fostering dialogue, capacity building, and technology transfer can have long-term
transformational effects that are challenging to measure (Chan, Ellinger, & Widerberg, 2018). Moreover, focusing on one form
of aggregation (e.g., emissions reduction, development finance) may result in overlooking co-benefits to other sustainable
development areas at best. At worst, it may mask negative consequences for other sustainability goals (Obergassel et al.,
2017; Von Stechow et al., 2015). For instance, while some initiatives for SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy) are compatible
with other SDGs, others may cancel out improvements (McCollum et al., 2018).
2.2 | Everybody wins
Without climate-resilient and sustainable development, all stand to lose, and existing achievements are at risk. “Everybody
wins” captures the view that nonstate actor engagement brings overall benefits through win–win constellations. While there
are different rationales for this view, not everyone stands to win from nonstate action.
Nonstate action can help overcome shortcomings of traditional governance (Beisheim & Liesse, 2014; Börzel & Risse,
2010; Hsu et al., 2015), for instance, by providing knowledge and information that support policies and by holding govern-
ments accountable (e.g., Setzer, 2015; Van Asselt, 2016). The emphasis under this rationale is on local actors and underrepre-
sented groups in traditional governance. For instance, nonstate actions can give voice to underrepresented groups, improving
democratic quality (Bäckstrand & Kuyper, 2017; Nasiritousi, Hjerpe, & Linnér, 2016; cf. Mert, 2019). Another variation of
“everybody wins” emphasizes the role of the private sector as their actions could lead to better outcomes for all by stimulating
growth, innovation, and employment (Pauw & Pegels, 2013). Private sector-led actions are often based on the assumption that
profits and social and environmental improvements can coexist (Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2015,
2016). Another variation highlights tangible improvements in well-being. Multistakeholder initiatives registered with the UN
often refer to specific SDG benefits (UNFCCC, 2018). For instance, initiatives introducing efficient cook stoves reduce bio-
mass combustion and improve air quality and health (Anenberg et al., 2013).
The assumption that everybody wins may, however, create blind spots to governance risks. While formal spaces for
engagement are increasing, the participation of, and benefit to, all actors is not guaranteed. For instance, the geography of non-
state actions registered with the UN is highly imbalanced, with most actions led by North-based actors (e.g., Pattberg, Bier-
mann, Chan, & Mert A. (Eds.)., 2012; Bulkeley et al., 2012). This raises the question whether most of their benefits would
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accrue in the global North rather than where resilience against climate impacts and sustainability needs are most urgent (Chan,
Ellinger, & Widerberg, 2018). Moreover, nonstate actions that aim to intervene in developing countries could effectively
address one objective while still leading to negative secondary impacts. To illustrate, forest initiatives could effectively con-
tribute to global mitigation efforts while having adverse effects on local communities (e.g., Schroeder, 2010; Suiseeya, 2017).
Powerful private, often North-based, actors can define standards in their own economic interests rather than according to
long-term and local sustainable development priorities (e.g., Nasiritousi, 2017). In contrast, smaller and less powerful groups,
such as domestic NGOs in developing countries, may lack the capacity to fully engage and shape the landscape of nonstate
action through agenda setting, consulting in decision-making processes and implementation (Ponte & Chenys, 2013; Scobie,
2016). In developing countries, governance gaps tend to be wider due to fewer resources for sustainable development chal-
lenges (Atteridge, 2011). Nonstate actions can still benefit developing countries (Chan, Ellinger, & Widerberg, 2018); how-
ever, specific risks need to be recognized, such as the creation of dependencies, the crowding out of public policies, and gaps
left once interventions are over. If these risks are not overcome, nonstate action could perpetuate, rather than solve, gover-
nance weaknesses in developing countries (e.g., Michalena & Hills, 2018).
2.3 | Everyone does their part
Nonstate action may play an important role in international negotiations, possibly opening pathways beyond gridlock (Hale, Held,
et al., 2017). “Everyone does their part” captures the view that nonstate actors play an instrumental role in implementation. This is
not about the number of actions but about the role of nonstate actors. In the run up to the Paris Agreement, a groundswell of climate
actions by all types of actors instilled confidence that a strong agreement would receive broad societal support (Jacobs, 2016).
Agenda 2030 declares that “all countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership, will implement [the SDGs]”
(UN General Assembly, 2015, emphasis added). The decision accompanying the Paris Agreement emphasizes that “non-Party
stakeholders” can contribute to implementation through scalable and replicable solutions (Chan, Brandi, & Bauer, 2016).
Perceptions of nonstate action as instrumental to implementation have allayed political opposition against nonstate actors (Chan
et al., 2016; Pattberg et al., 2012). The rationale is that, once political goals are set, a multiplicity of actors can do their part toward
achieving them. An “all-hands-on-deck” approach (Hale, 2016) is particularly attractive when the goals are urgent and time-bound.
However, nonstate actors make strategic considerations that could be of political consequence (Wright & Nyberg, 2015).
In some cases, the effectiveness of actions can be disputed. For instance, promoting natural gas as a transition fuel could lead
to long-term fossil fuel infrastructure lock-in. Others may set ambitious targets without the means to achieve them or rely on
nonexistent or controversial technologies. Yet others may not see benefits in acting at all or even engage in detrimental
actions. Such disingenuous actions, especially by economically influential businesses, could cast doubt over nonstate transfor-
mation pathways. A company could become “cleaner” by selling off unsustainable investments (such as in coal). If it is a gen-
eral trend, this would lead to segmentation into cleaner and dirtier markets or relocation of unsustainable operations to places
with lower standards, instead of positive net results. An important governance risk is that a growing belief in the benefits of,
and reliance on, nonstate action is not matched by actual outcomes.
Nonstate actors may also favor some actions over others. This is seen in “Partnerships for SDGs,” where many more
actions address SDG 14 (life below water) than SDG 10 (reduced inequalities). While not necessarily reflecting the scale of
proposed solutions, unequal patterns of engagement across different areas may become politically contentious (Bäckstrand
et al., 2017). Implementation is therefore not merely a matter of actors doing their part; the role of public actors remains
important, for example, by targeting areas that need more attention (e.g., Abbott, 2014; Chan et al., 2015; Chan, Falkner,
Goldberg, & Van Asselt, 2018; Hale & Roger, 2014).
2.4 | More will bring more
Although the number of nonstate actions is impressive, it will take considerable growth in action to realize sustainability and
climate resilience (e.g., Andonova, Hale, & Roger, 2017; Pattberg et al., 2012). “More will bring more” summarizes argu-
ments that actions tend to be catalytic. The emphasis here is not on the sheer numbers of actions but on the potential for
growth through replication and scaling, for instance, when nonstate actions promote new norms, build coalitions, and
strengthen capacities (e.g., Bernstein & Hoffmann, 2018; Hale, 2017).
Actions could replicate or be replicated following a logic of appropriateness, especially among similar types of actors (Betzold,
Bernauer, and Koubi 2016). As new norms become broadly supported, more actors will realign their activities. Such norm diffusion
can be amplified through coalition building, identifying and linking winners, empowering proactive actors, creating or altering
incentives, and reducing barriers. These mechanisms could widen and deepen transformations such as decarbonization (Bernstein &
Hoffmann, 2018). Growing engagement also increases problem-solving capacities by leveraging resources and by pooling knowl-
edge. Agenda 2030’s strong emphasis on partnerships that pool resources and knowledge from different sources assumes such
4 of 8 CHAN ET AL.
effects. Some actors, such as businesses and financial institutions, may see climate and sustainability actions as means to strengthen
their own economic activities and competitiveness (Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2015, 2016).
Learning and experimentation play a critical role in convincing skeptical actors (Rietig and Perkins, 2018) through institu-
tionalized sharing of experiences and linking nonstate actions to governmental processes (Abbott, 2017; Bernstein & Cashore,
2012). However, these opportunities should not imply that solutions are readily applicable. Experimentation may be more
effective within one sector or one region with shared cultural and socioeconomic characteristics (Chan, Falkner, et al., 2018).
The growth of action also fluctuates, with mobilization campaigns organized around political moments (Pattberg et al.,
2012). The close relation between action and political mobilization creates governance risks of its own. Mobilization cam-
paigns are usually short-lived and emphasize nonstate promises rather than actual progress against targets. This raises the
question of whether mobilization campaigns primarily generate promises without producing tangible progress (Figure 1).
3 | CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Nonstate actions are portrayed as replicable, apolitical, win–win solutions, generating optimism and confidence. Enthusiastic
arguments in their favour, however, should not prevent an honest appraisal of associated governance risks. The current empha-
sis on numbers suggests easy aggregation of impacts but ignores variegated effects of nonstate action. The claim that every-
body benefits may easily be contradicted by outcomes unaligned with priorities and needs in developing countries. While
nonstate efforts could and do complement governmental approaches, they can produce politically contentious outcomes, par-
ticularly when commitments are not kept, and some sustainability goals remain underaddressed. Finally, without efforts to
stimulate learning and political momentum, the growth of nonstate action may be limited. Rather than responding to each risk
individually, we suggest three combinable strategies to mitigate multiple risks.
First, an enabling environment can provide incentives for nonstate actors to engage, for instance, through improving access
to knowledge, high-level recognition, material and immaterial support, and conveying that climate and sustainability action is
doable. In the climate realm, the so-called “Talanoa Dialogue” was envisaged to provide an inclusive space for actors to
exchange experiences. Such processes can help create shared understandings of needs and priorities and build trust. However,
calls for coordination do not dissipate. Coordination can include promotion of action in underserved areas, for example, by
signaling risks of duplication of efforts, facilitating collaboration where synergies exist, and addressing trade-offs. Coordina-
tion can also include the institutionalization of feedback mechanisms between international agendas and nonstate actors
FIGURE 1 Arguments overview
[Correction added on 11 January 2019, after first online publication: Figure 1 and its citation have been added.]
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(Hermwille, 2018; Persson, Weitz, & Nilsson, 2016). For example, “voluntary national reviews” of SDG implementation and
5-year reviews under the Paris Agreement could check the progress of nonstate actions and compatibility with sustainability
goals.
Second, nonstate action needs to be grounded in national and regional contexts. Here, we see considerable variation across
developed and developing countries, with much fewer recorded actions in the latter. The chief challenge is not to numerically
balance out engagement. Imbalances may reflect uneven capacities and resources and different priorities. Instead, strengthen-
ing capabilities and fostering participation could help to empower developing country-based actors to take action. However,
the onus should not only be on developing countries. Both the Paris Agreement and Agenda 2030 emphasize developed coun-
tries' responsibilities in implementation and international cooperation. This calls on all governments to gain broad societal sup-
port and buy-in from an array of constituencies.
Third, in all countries, the challenge is to stimulate action beyond “champions” and frontrunners. Frontrunners alone will
not have the breath to further long-term transformations if others do not step up. Far-reaching transformations cannot be
achieved without critical masses of engagement by actors that are not yet taking action. Moreover, large-scale transformations,
like decarbonization, require painful choices. Governments need to bring to attention the ramifications of the sustainable and
climate-resilient futures they have committed to and give nonstate actors a fair chance to adapt.
The relation between nonstate action and traditional governance may evolve differently across sustainable development
and climate governance, likely calling for multiple and tailored strategies. Moreover, these strategies are not strictly related to
policymaking but also prompt further research for better governance with nonstate actors, focusing on the many and complex
interactions between actors in a fragmented governance environment (e.g., Zelli, 2011), how actions can be stimulated in the
most critical areas, and how differences between and across types of actors may relate to governance risks. Specific knowl-
edge will also be key to critically appraise geographically imbalanced outcomes of nonstate actions. When studying the nov-
elty of observed phenomena, however, the stubbornness of old practices can easily be underestimated. It is therefore vital to
study not only the increasing number of nonstate actions but also how consequential they are, whether they substitute unsus-
tainable activities, and whether their scope is broad enough to generate systemic change.
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ENDNOTES
1“Nonstate actors” refer to a broad and diverse category of stakeholders that are not UN member states. In the category of non-
state actors, we do not include individuals. For a definition of nonstate actors, see Bäckstrand et al. (2017, p. 564).
2This opinion builds on a dialogue on the interconnections between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the
Paris Agreement, originating from the “Interconnections Conference” held in Bonn in May 2017. This dialogue laid the basis
for a reflection involving researchers, decision makers, and practitioners, with perspectives and experiences across developed
and developing countries.
3By climate resilience, we denote low-carbon, adaptive, and resilience-building development.
4This process is not an analysis of the language that supports nonstate engagement (cf. Mert, 2015); rather, it is intended to
elaborate on assumptions and related governance risks.
5Dialogue was facilitated during and following the 2017 Interconnections Conference (May 12–13, 2017) at the German
Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), which aimed at an inclusive and transdisciplinary
exploration the role of state, nonstate, and subnational actors across sustainability and climate governance among scholars,
practitioners, and policymakers from developed and developing countries.
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